

B. State(s) against which the application is directed

17. Tick the name(s) of the State(s) against which the application is directed.

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| <input type="checkbox"/> ALB - Albania | <input type="checkbox"/> ITA - Italy |
| <input type="checkbox"/> AND - Andorra | <input type="checkbox"/> LIE - Liechtenstein |
| <input type="checkbox"/> ARM - Armenia | <input type="checkbox"/> LTU - Lithuania |
| <input type="checkbox"/> AUT - Austria | <input type="checkbox"/> LUX - Luxembourg |
| <input type="checkbox"/> AZE - Azerbaijan | <input type="checkbox"/> LVA - Latvia |
| <input type="checkbox"/> BEL - Belgium | <input type="checkbox"/> MCO - Monaco |
| <input type="checkbox"/> BGR - Bulgaria | <input type="checkbox"/> MDA - Republic of Moldova |
| <input type="checkbox"/> BIH - Bosnia and Herzegovina | <input type="checkbox"/> MKD - North Macedonia |
| <input type="checkbox"/> CHE - Switzerland | <input type="checkbox"/> MLT - Malta |
| <input type="checkbox"/> CYP - Cyprus | <input type="checkbox"/> MNE - Montenegro |
| <input type="checkbox"/> CZE - Czech Republic | <input type="checkbox"/> NLD - Netherlands |
| <input type="checkbox"/> DEU - Germany | <input type="checkbox"/> NOR - Norway |
| <input type="checkbox"/> DNK - Denmark | <input type="checkbox"/> POL - Poland |
| <input type="checkbox"/> ESP - Spain | <input type="checkbox"/> PRT - Portugal |
| <input type="checkbox"/> EST - Estonia | <input type="checkbox"/> ROU - Romania |
| <input type="checkbox"/> FIN - Finland | <input type="checkbox"/> RUS - Russian Federation* |
| <input type="checkbox"/> FRA - France | <input type="checkbox"/> SMR - San Marino |
| <input type="checkbox"/> GBR - United Kingdom | <input type="checkbox"/> SRB - Serbia |
| <input type="checkbox"/> GEO - Georgia | <input type="checkbox"/> SVK - Slovak Republic |
| <input type="checkbox"/> GRC - Greece | <input type="checkbox"/> SVN - Slovenia |
| <input type="checkbox"/> HRV - Croatia | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SWE - Sweden |
| <input type="checkbox"/> HUN - Hungary | <input type="checkbox"/> TUR - Türkiye |
| <input type="checkbox"/> IRL - Ireland | <input type="checkbox"/> UKR - Ukraine |
| <input type="checkbox"/> ISL - Iceland | |

* On 16 September 2022 the Russian Federation ceased to be a Party to the European Convention on Human Rights.

Subject matter of the application

All the information concerning the facts, complaints and compliance with the requirements of exhaustion of domestic remedies and the four-month time-limit laid down in Article 35 § 1 of the Convention must be set out in this part of the application form (sections E, F and G). It is not acceptable to leave these sections blank or simply to refer to attached sheets. See Rule 47 § 2 and the Practice Direction on the Institution of proceedings as well as the "Notes for filling in the application form".

E. Statement of the facts

58.

I. INTRODUCTION

1. Mr Samir Sabri (the "Applicant") is a Swedish citizen. He was born in 1970 and lives in Stockholm. He is currently working with the organisation Second Chance, who now offers living facilities and practical assistance to people struggling to escape a life of crime and drug addiction. The Applicant co-founded the organisation in 2010.

2. The Applicant was wrongfully convicted of murder in 1986. Thirty years later, the conviction was reversed, but he was denied compensation, leaving serious failures in the judicial process unaddressed. He now turns to the Court for just satisfaction for Sweden's violation of his rights under Article 3 of Protocol No. 7 ("A3P7").

II. MS JANETTE SABRI IS MURDERED

3. On 21 May 1986, the Applicant's stepmother, Ms [REDACTED] Sabri, was brutally murdered in her bed. Her husband – the Applicant's father – stabbed his wife over thirty times with the Applicant and his younger brother still at home. The father then turned to the Applicant and threatened to kill him and his brother unless the Applicant confessed and assumed liability for his father's crime.

4. Under this imminent threat, and just fifteen years old at the time, the Applicant falsely confessed to Ms Sabri's murder. The Applicant was then arrested, and the Stockholm Police initiated a preliminary investigation into her murder.

III. THE POLICE AND PROSECUTOR MAKE CRITICAL PROCEDURAL FAILURES

5. The police and prosecutor did not fully analyse the evidence during the preliminary investigation, and did not sufficiently entertain alternative hypotheses (see bundle p. 155):

(i) The Applicant was not assigned a defence counsel for his initial interviews with the police. He was only fifteen years old at the time and had just confessed to the brutal murder of his stepmother, and yet, he was left alone with the interrogation officer. (See bundle pp. 60 and 66.)

(ii) The Applicant told the police that he stabbed the victim eight to nine times (see bundle pp. 62 and 67). The autopsy, however, showed that Ms Sabri had several lacerations on her body, resulting from approximately thirty stabs or cuts (see bundle p. 37). This discrepancy was not further investigated.

(iii) The Applicant told the police that he had strangled Ms Sabri (see bundle pp. 63 and 68). The autopsy, however, did not show any signs of strangulation (see bundle p. 27). This discrepancy was not further investigated.

(iv) The crime scene showed an abundance of blood, and the bed sheets and pillows showed blood splatter and blood drops. The Applicant's clothing, however, did not reflect this blood pattern and lacked any signs of blood splatter. (See bundle p. 124.) This discrepancy was not further investigated, and a blood stain pattern analysis was not ordered from the National Laboratory of Forensic Science (sv. Statens kriminaltekniska laboratorium, SKL).

(v) The Applicant told the police that the murder had been committed sometime after 7:30 am (see bundle p. 61). However, no forensic analysis was conducted to establish the time of death and verify the Applicant's statement. In 2015, as part of the Applicant's petition for reversal of his conviction, a forensic analysis revealed that the time of rigor mortis ruled out that Ms Sabri could have been killed after 04:00 am. The murder was thus committed at a point when the father was still at home (see bundle p. 124).

(vi) When questioned by the police, a neighbour stated that neither he nor his girlfriend had heard any commotion after 6:30 am that morning. While he frequently heard fighting and loud quarrels involving the Applicant's father, he had never heard or seen any signs of conflict between the Applicant and Ms Sabri. The neighbour's statements, although indicating an alternative course of events, were not further investigated. (See bundle p. 55.)

Statement of the facts (continued)

59.
(vii) The police and prosecutor knew that the Applicant's family had repeatedly and for many years been involved with the Swedish social services due to conflicts within the family. They did not investigate it further.

IV. THE APPLICANT IS WRONGFULLY CONVICTED OF MURDER

6. On 1 October 1986, the Stockholm District Court convicted the Applicant of murder (see bundle pp. 70–74). The Applicant was sentenced to institutional psychiatric care. The judgment was not appealed and became final on 22 October 1986.

7. The principle of unfettered evaluation of the evidence (sv. fri bevisvärdering) applies in Swedish courts, meaning that the sole relevant criterion for the purpose of assessing the evidence is its credibility. As such, a confession is not an immediate proof of guilt and must be evaluated in the same manner as any other evidence. Typically, this means that a confession requires evidence that independently corroborates the guilt of the accused. Indeed, the travaux préparatoires of the Swedish Code (1942:740) of Judicial Procedure (sv. rättegångsbalken) expressly state that a confession cannot be used as ground for conviction, unless is it substantiated by other circumstances (see bundle pp. 1–2).

8. In the case of the Applicant's conviction, the Stockholm District Court held that the information provided by the Applicant, combined with other evidence, supported his confession. However, in the reversal proceedings in 2016, the Svea Court of Appeal noted that the grounds for the original conviction did not account for the nature of the information provided by the Applicant, in what ways different parts of evidence were evaluated, or any assessment of the combined value of the evidence presented (see bundle p. 163). Additionally, the prosecutor in the reversal proceedings submitted that the conviction was almost entirely based on the Applicant's confession (see bundle p. 155).

9. In essence, the Stockholm District Court convicted the Applicant, only fifteen years old at the time, of murder without any real corroborative evidence available or referred to. The grounds of the judgment were contained within a single paragraph.

V. THE APPLICANT RETRACTS HIS CONFESSION, BUT THE POLICE AND PROSECUTOR FAIL TO REMEDY THE FAILINGS OF THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION

10. In January 1988, the Applicant retracted his confession and recounted the true course of events, telling the authorities that it had in fact been his father who committed the murder (see bundle pp. 80–94). The preliminary investigation was then resumed.

11. Two of the psychiatrists from the Applicant's psychiatric facility, Dr [REDACTED] and Dr [REDACTED] both met and interacted with the Applicant's father. Both gave concerning accounts of the Applicant's father to the police, stating that it was evident that he was psychotic and suffering from paranoia (see bundle pp. 77 and 98–99). Additionally, Dr. [REDACTED] reported the father to the police for unlawful threat (see bundle p. 121).

12. Despite the Applicant's detailed accusations against his father, and troubling accounts from two psychiatrists who had met with the Applicant's father and a police report against the father, the father was never interrogated during the resumed preliminary investigation.

13. The Applicant also pointed out to the police that considering the way Ms Sabri had been stabbed, it must have caused blood splatter on the clothes of her murderer (see bundle p. 91). Yet, no blood stain pattern analysis of the Applicant's clothing was conducted even during the resumed preliminary investigation.

14. On 9 June 1988, the prosecutor decided to discontinue the resumed preliminary investigation, stating that there was no indication that someone other than the Applicant had committed the murder (see bundle p. 122).

15. The Applicant remained institutionalised until 31 March 1988, deprived of his liberty for a total of nearly two years. For another 30 years he would be wrongly considered guilty of the brutal murder of his stepmother and stigmatised by society. At this point in the Applicant's life, considering his young age and complete lack of support system, he did not have the capacity, possibility nor resources to initiate and follow through on proceedings to reverse the conviction.

VI. NEW FACTS LEAD TO THE APPLICANT'S CONVICTION BEING REVERSED

16. In 2015, the Applicant, aided pro bono by a prominent Swedish defence counsel and an investigative journalist,

Statement of the facts (continued)

60. petitioned for a reversal (sv. resning) of his murder conviction based on new forensic analysis and testimony as well the flaws of the original preliminary investigations.

17. On 7 April 2016, the Svea Court of Appeal granted the Applicant's petition for reversal of his conviction, quashed the 1986 judgment and submitted the case for re-adjudication before the Stockholm District Court (case no. Ö 7110-15, see bundle p. 157). On 13 December 2016, the prosecutor dropped the charges against the Applicant, and the Stockholm District Court acquitted the Applicant (case no. B 4343-16, see bundle p. 168).

18. In the reversal decision from the Svea Court of Appeal on 7 April 2016, the court referred to the following new facts:

(i) Testimony from a) [REDACTED] the brother of the Applicant; b) [REDACTED] friend of [REDACTED] c) [REDACTED] former girlfriend of the Applicant; d) [REDACTED] former wife of the Applicant's father; and e) [REDACTED] therapist of [REDACTED] all explaining that the Applicant did not murder Ms Sabri (see bundle p. 165).

(ii) Forensic analysis from [REDACTED] former detective and forensic science technician, stating that the blood stains on the Applicant's clothing were not consistent with the Applicant stabbing Ms Sabri's chest, arms and legs. Rather, it was consistent with the Applicant purportedly lying down in the blood in the bed, which would be in accordance with the Applicant's own account of the course of events (see bundle pp. 127–131 and 165).

(iii) Forensic analysis from [REDACTED] forensic science technician and bloodstain pattern analyst, stating that if the Applicant had repeatedly stabbed the victim, the Applicant's clothing would have shown corresponding blood stains, which they did not. Instead, the blood pattern on the clothing showed transferred, swiped and/or wiped blood, which would be in accordance with the Applicant's own recount of the course of events (see bundle p. 132-143, 165-166).

VII. THE APPLICANT SEEKS COMPENSATION FROM THE STATE

19. Having been detained and subsequently institutionalised, the Applicant was deprived of his liberty between 21 May 1986 and 31 March 1988. Shortly after the reversal of his conviction, the Applicant requested compensation for the wrongful deprivation of his liberty with the Chancellor of Justice (sv. Justitiekanslern). On 6 September 2017, the Chancellor of Justice dismissed his request, citing that the ten-year limitation period had elapsed as it had begun on the day the Applicant was deprived of his liberty on 21 May 1986. The Applicant sued the Government in the general courts, claiming that the limitation period had not expired as it had begun on the day of his acquittal on 13 December 2016.

20. On 24 June 2020, the Stockholm District Court found that the limitation period had not expired. However, the Applicant was denied compensation for wrongful deprivation of liberty with reference to a provision in the Swedish Act (1974:515) on compensation for deprivation of liberty ("the Compensation Act", sv. frihetsinskränkninglagen) stipulating that there is no right to compensation if the person has deliberately caused the deprivation of liberty (sv. "själv uppsåtligt har föranlett denna"). (Case no. T 12325-19, see bundle pp. 183–205.)

21. The Applicant appealed to the Svea Court of Appeal. On 1 July 2021, the Svea Court of Appeal found that the limitation period had not expired and that, due to the special circumstances in the Applicant's case, the exemption provision in the Compensation Act was not applicable. Accordingly, the Applicant was granted SEK 1,200,000 for the state's wrongful deprivation of his liberty. (Case no. T 8528-20, see bundle pp. 206–238.)

22. The Government appealed to the Supreme Court. On 30 June 2022, the Supreme Court found that while a person cannot be considered to have deliberately caused the deprivation of liberty if he or she confessed under threat, it could not be proven that the Applicant had in fact confessed under threat. This finding entirely overlooked the fact that it was not in dispute between the parties that the Applicant had indeed confessed under what he perceived as an imminent threat. Further, the Supreme Court did not consider the issue of the flawed preliminary investigation and its direct relevance to the wrongful conviction. Accordingly, the Applicant was denied compensation for the state's wrongful deprivation of his liberty. (Case no. T 4705-21, see bundle pp. 239–249.)

23. A dissenting judge, however, voted to award the Applicant compensation, arguing that the exceptions to awarding compensation under the Compensation Act should be interpreted narrowly, and in conformity with the requirements of A3P7 (see bundle pp. 246–249).

F. Statement of alleged violation(s) of the Convention and/or Protocols and relevant arguments

<p>61. Article invoked</p> <p>Article 3 of Protocol No. 7</p>	<p>Explanation</p> <p>24. To date, the Court's case-law on A3P7 is limited. This case presents the Court with an opportunity to develop its case-law and clarify how the exception to compensation under A3P7 should be construed – particularly with respect to coerced false confessions by vulnerable individuals.</p> <p>VIII. THE APPLICABLE TEST</p> <p>25. Sweden violated the Applicant's right to compensation under A3P7 if:</p> <p>A. His conviction was reversed on the ground of new or newly discovered facts;</p> <p>B. These facts conclusively show that the Applicant has suffered a miscarriage of justice;</p> <p>C. The state fails to prove that the non-disclosure of the unknown facts is wholly or partly attributable to the Applicant; and</p> <p>D. The Applicant was denied compensation for the wrongful conviction.</p> <p>As set out below, the Applicant submits that these conditions are met and that Sweden violated his rights under A3P7.</p> <p>IX. (A) THE APPLICANT'S CONVICTION WAS REVERSED ON THE GROUND OF NEW FACTS</p> <p>26. The Applicant was convicted of murder by judgment of the Stockholm District Court on 1 October 1986. The conviction was then reversed by the Svea Court of Appeal on 7 April 2016 in case no. Ö 7110-15, due to new forensic analysis and testimony (see para. 18 above for an account of the new evidence and bundle, p. 163, where the Court of Appeal states that the evidence invoked by the Applicant in the reversal proceedings constituted new evidence).</p> <p>X. (B) THE NEW FACTS CONCLUSIVELY SHOW THAT THE APPLICANT SUFFERED A MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE</p> <p>27. The Applicant submits that there has been a serious failure in the judicial process involving grave prejudice amounting to a miscarriage of justice (see the definition of miscarriage of justice set out in the Explanatory Report on Protocol No. 7, paras 23 and 25). As the prosecutor concluded in the reversal proceedings, the new evidence unequivocally disproved that the Applicant murdered Ms Sabri (see bundle p. 155). It has also been established before the domestic courts that the Applicant was prosecuted after a preliminary investigation tainted by a manifest lack of due process (see para. 5 above). He was convicted almost entirely on the basis of his coerced confession – even though under Swedish law a defendant may only be convicted for a serious crime on his confession if it is substantiated by corroborative evidence (see extract from the travaux préparatoires to the Swedish Code on Judicial Procedure, SOU 1938:44 part II, p. 380, bundle pp. 1–2 and the prosecutor's submissions in the reversal proceedings, bundle p. 155–156). The new evidence, therefore, conclusively show that the Applicant suffered a miscarriage of justice.</p> <p>XI. (C) THE NON-DISCLOSURE OF THE UNKNOWN FACTS IS NOT ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE APPLICANT</p> <p>28. It is for the state to prove that the non-disclosure of the new facts is attributable to the Applicant. The Applicant submits that it is not.</p> <p>29. First, the non-disclosure with respect to the forensic analysis was caused by a failure of the prosecutor to order a bloodstain pattern analysis from the National Laboratory of Forensic Science. This is a standard measure in murder investigations – and was so also in 1986. The responsibility to conduct an objective and thorough investigation lies with the state (see inter alia Chapter 23, Section 4 of the Swedish Code of Judicial Procedure). The non-disclosure here is thus wholly attributable to the state.</p> <p>30. Second, the facts of the new testimony should have come to light already during the preliminary investigation if the police and prosecutor had fulfilled their obligation to</p>
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Statement of alleged violation(s) of the Convention and/or Protocols and relevant arguments (continued)

<p>62. Article invoked</p> <p>Article 3 of Protocol No. 7</p>	<p>Explanation</p> <p>entertain alternative hypotheses (see the prosecutor's submissions in the reversal proceedings, bundle pp. 155–156). This omission cannot be attributable to the Applicant. The presumption of innocence requires that the burden of proof be on the state (see <i>inter alia</i> <i>Telfner v. Austria</i>, no. 33501/96, § 15, 20 March 2001). It would run counter to this principle if compensation was precluded whenever the defence failed to call witnesses that could exonerate the defendant. In order to ensure that the interpretation of A3P7 is consistent with Article 6.2 of the Convention, the non-disclosure of the testimony cannot be attributable to the Applicant.</p> <p>31. Third, the Applicant submits that his coerced confession during the preliminary investigation and initial trial do not preclude compensation. As evidenced by the Court's case-law, a confession does not preclude compensation <i>per se</i> (see <i>Poghosyan and Baghdasaryan v. Armenia</i>, no. 22999/06, ECHR 2012). Instead, the exception to the right to compensation must be construed in light of the object and purpose of A3P7 (see Article 31 § 1 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties) – that is to say, to provide an additional guarantee for the equitable administration of justice and to ensure that miscarriages of justice are not left unaddressed (see the rationale of Article 14.6 of the ICCPR which is cast in almost identical terms as A3P7, Summary record of the Economic and Social Council, E/CN.4/SR.157, p. 14 and E/CN.4/SR.158, pp. 3 ff.). The exception must also be construed in light of the principle that the Convention is “intended to guarantee not rights that are theoretical or illusory, but rights that are practical and effective” (see <i>Airey v. Ireland</i>, 9 October 1979, § 24, Series A no. 32).</p> <p>32. To that end, the Applicant's vulnerability is of particular relevance (see <i>mutatis mutandis Tarakhel v. Switzerland [GC]</i>, no. 29217/12, § 119, ECHR 2014, extracts, where the Court held that special protection may need to be afforded to children in view of their specific needs and vulnerability). At the time of the wrongful conviction, the Applicant was a child who had witnessed his father brutally murder his stepmother in their home and then been forced to assume liability for his father's actions. The Government has not disputed that the Applicant confessed under what he perceived to be an imminent threat to his and his brother's life.</p> <p>33. To find that the non-disclosure of facts was somehow “attributable” to the Applicant in these circumstances would entertain an excessively restrictive and theoretical interpretation of the Convention that would be entirely contrary to the object and purpose of A3P7 and to the principle of effectiveness. The responsibility for ensuring that children in vulnerable situations are not wrongfully convicted based on coerced confessions, and on grave procedural failings, must ultimately lie with the state. A finding to the contrary would render the right to compensation under A3P7 illusory, contradict the presumption of innocence, and absolve states from their responsibility to take sufficient steps to prevent and remedy miscarriages of justice.</p> <p>XII. (D) SWEDEN VIOLATED THE CONVENTION WHEN THE SUPREME COURT DENIED THE APPLICANT COMPENSATION</p> <p>34. As the non-disclosure of the unknown facts was not attributable to the Applicant, he is entitled to compensation for the wrongful conviction. The domestic courts, nevertheless, denied him compensation. The Applicant respectfully requests, therefore, that the Court find that Sweden violated A3P7 and award the Applicant just satisfaction.</p>
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G. Compliance with admissibility criteria laid down in Article 35 § 1 of the Convention

For each complaint, please confirm that you have used the available effective remedies in the country concerned, including appeals, and also indicate the date when the final decision at domestic level was delivered and received, to show that you have complied with the four-month time-limit.

<p>63. Complaint</p> <p>Article 3 of Protocol No. 7</p>	<p>Information about remedies used and the date of the final decision</p> <p>35. The Applicant has complied with the four-month time limit to file the application. This time limit commenced once the Supreme Court ruled against the Applicant on 30 June 2022 and his claim for compensation under the Compensation Act was denied. The Applicant was not required to exhaust any additional remedies for the purposes of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention.</p> <p>36. The purpose of exhaustion is, notably, that the domestic authorities should have had the opportunity to determine Convention compliance of national law before a case is submitted to the Court (see inter alia the Court's case-law in <i>Burden v. the United Kingdom</i> [GC], no. 13378/05, § 42, ECHR 2008). The domestic courts have already had an opportunity to put right the Applicant's claim with respect to the Convention during the compensation proceedings. Indeed, the issue of whether the relevant provisions under the Compensation Act should be interpreted in light of A3P7 was addressed during the hearing before the Supreme Court. The dissenting judge who voted to award the Applicant compensation then argued in his dissenting opinion that the exceptions on compensation under Compensation Act should be interpreted narrowly, and in conformity with the requirements of A3P7.</p> <p>37. Even so, an applicant is only required to exhaust remedies under Article 35 § 1 of the Convention that are effective and offer reasonable prospects of success (see inter alia <i>Sejdovic v. Italy</i> [GC], no. 56581/00, § 46, ECHR 2006-II). After his claim for compensation under the Compensation Act was denied by the Supreme Court, the Applicant did not have access to any additional effective remedies to vindicate his rights under A3P7. The Applicant thus submits that he was not required, in addition to his compensation claim under the Compensation Act, to also seek compensation for the violation of his A3P7 rights under Chapter 3, Section 4 of the Swedish Torts Act (1972:207, sv. skadeståndslagen) before either the Chancellor of Justice or the general courts.</p> <p>38. The Chancellor of Justice already denied his claim for compensation and held that compensation should not be awarded to the Applicant. The Chancellor of Justice was then the Applicant's counterparty in the proceedings under the Compensation Act before the general courts, opposing his claim. The Applicant would have no reasonable prospect of success to engage with the Chancellor of Justice a third time, albeit under a different legal provision, and so should not need to do so in order to fulfill the exhaustion requirement under Article 35 § 1 of the Convention.</p> <p>39. The general courts for their part have rejected the Applicant's claim for compensation through a final judgment on the merits by the Supreme Court. A new claim under the Torts Act for the violation of A3P7 would rely on essentially the same grounds as the claim for compensation under the Compensation Act. Succeeding with such a claim would, therefore, require either that the lower courts rejected the findings of the Supreme Court, at least in part, or that the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal again and reconsidered the case. Neither of these alternatives are plausible (see by comparison, <i>Dragan Kovačević v. Croatia</i>, no. 49281/15, § 42, 12 May 2022, where the Court found it unlikely that civil courts would have granted the applicant's claim, after the Constitutional Court had refused a similar claim).</p> <p>40. For these reasons, the Applicant was not required to engage with the Chancellor of Justice a third time or avail himself of the general courts a second time before bringing his case before the Court.</p>
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- Please ensure that the information you include here does not exceed the space provided -

64. Is or was there an appeal or remedy available to you which you have not used?

Yes

No

65. If you answered Yes above, please state which appeal or remedy you have not used and explain why not

41. For the reasons explained in section G above, the Applicant has not sought damages with the Chancellor of Justice or the general courts for the violation of his rights under A3P7. He is, however, not required to do so under Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. Those remedies are ineffective because of the feeble prospects of success of bringing a new claim for compensation on essentially the same ground as the claim for compensation finally decided by the Supreme Court. And the Applicant has already, through the previous compensation proceedings, afforded the domestic courts an opportunity to determine the compatibility of the Compensation Act with the Convention.

H. Information concerning other international proceedings (if any)

66. Have you raised any of these complaints in another procedure of international investigation or settlement?

Yes

No

67. If you answered Yes above, please give a concise summary of the procedure (complaints submitted, name of the international body and date and nature of any decisions given)

68. Do you (the applicant) currently have, or have you previously had, any other applications before the Court?

Yes

No

69. If you answered Yes above, please write the relevant application number(s) in the box below

I. List of accompanying documents

You should enclose full and legible copies of all documents. No documents will be returned to you. It is thus in your interests to submit copies, not originals. You MUST:

- arrange the documents in order by date and by set of proceedings;
- number the pages consecutively; and
- NOT staple, bind or tape the documents.

70. In the box below, please list the documents in chronological order with a concise description. Indicate the page number at which each document may be found

1.	Extract from the travaux préparatoire to the Swedish Code on Judicial Procedure, SOU 1938:44 part II, 1938	p.	1
2.	Preliminary investigation report in case K 56123-86, 24.06.1986	p.	3
3.	Judgment of the Stockholm District Court in case B 322/86, 01.10.1986	p.	70
4.	Police interview with Dr [REDACTED] during the resumed preliminary investigation, 14.01.1988	p.	75
5.	Police interview with the Applicant during the resumed preliminary investigation, 15.01.1988	p.	80
6.	Police interview with Dr [REDACTED] during the resumed preliminary investigation, 22.03.1988	p.	95
7.	Police report against the Applicant's father, 10.05.1988	p.	121
8.	Decision of the Public Prosecutor to discontinue the resumed preliminary investigation, 09.06.1988	p.	122
9.	Forensic analysis by [REDACTED] 24.04.2015	p.	123
10.	Forensic analysis by [REDACTED] 10.06.2015	p.	127
11.	Forensic analysis by [REDACTED] 13.10.2015	p.	132
12.	Public Prosecutor's submissions in the reversal proceedings, 16.10.2015	p.	144
13.	Decision of the Svea Court of Appeal in the reversal proceedings, 07.04.2016	p.	157
14.	Judgment of the Stockholm District Court in the reversal proceedings, 13.12.2016	p.	168
15.	Application for compensation for wrongful deprivation of liberty, 31.03.2017	p.	172
16.	Decision of the Chancellor of Justice to deny compensation for wrongful deprivation of liberty, 06.09.2017	p.	179
17.	Judgment of the Stockholm District Court in case T 12325-19, 24.06.2020	p.	183
18.	Judgment of the Svea Court of Appeal in case T 8528-20, 01.07.2021	p.	206
19.	Judgment of the Supreme Court in case T 4705-21, 30.06.2022	p.	239
20.		p.	
21.		p.	
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23.		p.	
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